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Auth CS USAF

5 JULY 1951

D/I, USAF SUGGESTED CHANGES TO SE-8:

"POSSIBLE COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES IN PROPOSING

A CEASE FIRE IN KOREA"

(Draft of 3 July 1951)

Review of this document by CIA has determined that

☒ CIA has no objection to declass
It contains information of CIA
interest that must remain
classified at TS S G

Authority: HR 70-2

☐ It contains nothing of CIA interest

Date 10 Feb 81 Reviewer 006514

1. Reference Page 1, Par 1, first sentence. Revise as follows:

We believe that, while the Kremlin has probably not decided upon any specific course of action, it is likely that the Communists desire largely to ease-out disengage from the Korean conflict.

2. Reference Page 2. Insert the following as new paragraph 2 and re-number succeeding paragraphs accordingly:

we believe
2. ~~It must be expected~~ that the Kremlin is fully aware that *a military* ~~essential~~ disengagement in Korea will permit utilization of the ~~Chinese Communist resources to~~ *elsewhere* elsewhere in Asia, and *free* Communist resources generally for utilization ~~somewhere else~~ *elsewhere* in the world. *the Kremlin may estimate that* Furthermore, ~~not only would~~ the employment of US-UN forces *would* be more difficult and less effective against ~~any~~ aggression elsewhere, but in view of their closeness, the retention of ~~only~~ *even* a "Corporal's Guard" by the Chinese Communists in the Korean or Manchurian area would tie down substantial UN forces there.

3. Reference Page 2, Par 2. Revise first sentence as follows:

We believe that the Kremlin is probably reluctant to accept at this time the greatly increased risk of general war that would result if it took the ~~military~~ measures necessary to ~~bring-the-Korean-conflict~~ ~~to-a-successful-conclusion~~ overcome, by military action, the UN forces in Korea.

USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File

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4. Reference Page 2, Par. 3. Add the following:

Nor can the possibility be overlooked that the cease fire proposal is deliberate treachery and a cover for a Communist surprise attack in the Far East or elsewhere. Whatever the Soviet motive in suggesting a cease fire, the increased Communist offensive capability resulting from a suspension or interruption in military action will enhance their bargaining position at all stages of negotiations.

5. Reference Page 7, Par. 11. Revise as follows:

11. The Communists clearly are striving ~~energetically~~ to improve their military position regardless of the outcome of the cease fire discussions. They may intend (1) to use the time gained by the cease fire proposal solely to improve their military position prior to a new offensive; (2) to use the time gained by the armistice and post-armistice negotiations to improve their military position and then launch their offensive; or (3) to use the armistice and post-armistice negotiations as a first step toward the liquidation of the Communist military venture in Korea. If the Communists pursue either of the first two objectives, their tactics will vary depending upon the length of time they may require to improve their military position. If they pursue the third alternative, they may attempt to liquidate the Korean conflict either by prolonging the armistice indefinitely, thus in effect restoring by retaining the division of Korea at the 38th Parallel, or they may proceed from the armistice to a political settlement of the Korean conflict and even of broader Far Eastern issues; (4) to use protracted armistice or post-armistice political negotiations as a means

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to permit an essential disengagement of their forces and so to free

them for deployment and employment elsewhere; or (5) to use the

negotiations as a cover for the possible launching of a global conflict.

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